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Ashley Packard*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its current term, the Supreme Court is addressing a much-debated question
among legal scholars-whether copyright law encroaches upon freedom of
expression.' The justices will review a controversial decision issued by the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeals court held that
copyright is immune from First Amendment challenges.'
Furthermore, it
concluded that in crafting copyright legislation Congress is not bound by the
introductory language in the Constitution's Copyright Clause,3 which states that
copyright's purpose is "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."'

•Assistant Professor of Communication, University of Houston-Clear Lake.
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842 (D.C. Cir. 2001), nhg dededsub mom.,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849,59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (D.C. Cr.2001) (en bane), ctw.gmnte,
122 S.Ct. 1062 (U.S. Feb. 19,2002) (No. 01-618). The case was argued before the Supreme Court

on Oct. 9, 2002. The Court had not yet issued an opinion as of this Article's print time. The
Supreme Court's docket is posted on its Web site, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/
docket.html (enter docket number 01-618 in search field) (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
2

3
4

Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375.
Id at 378.

U.S. CONsT. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
8.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

1

Journal of Intellectual
Property Law,
Vol. L10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2 [Vol. 10:1
J. I'ELL
PROP.
Petitioners in Eldred v.Ashcroft,s the case under consideration, are involved in
enterprises that reproduce, restore or add value to works in the public domain.6
They argue that the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which
prospectively and retrospectively extends copyright terms, impinges upon their
First Amendment freedoms of speech and press' by denying them access to
millions of works that will now be kept out of the public domain for another
twenty years.9 They also argue that the Act's retrospective extensions violate both
the Constitution's Copyright Clause,"0 which grants Congress the power to
protect a work for- limited times, and the Copyright Act's requirement of
originality."
The case is significant because its outcome has the potential to determine the
constitutionality of term extensions and the value that our legal system places on
the public domain. Even more importantly, it may determine whether the First
Amendment can be considered applicable to copyright law at all.
Many legal scholars believe the court of appeals' conclusion that there can be
no First Amendment challenge to a copyright statute sets an astounding precedent
with implications that go beyond the realm of term extensions to other laws that
also have the potential to harm freedom of expression and the public domain. 2

5 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), rhg dniedsub nomn.,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255
F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), cm. granted, 122 S. Ct 1062 (U.S. Feb. 19, 2002) (No. 01-618).
The Supreme Court's docket is posted on its Web site, athttp://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/
docket.html (enter docket number 01-618 in search field) (last visited Dec. 1, 2002).
6 Lead petitioner is Eric Eldred, the publisher of Eldritch Press, a free Internet library of public
domain works, at http://www.eldritchpress.org/ (last modified Nov. 25, 2002). Other petitioners
are Higginson Book Co.; Jill A. Crandall; Tri-Horn Int'l; Luck's Music Library, Inc.; Edwin F.
Kalmus & Co., Inc.; American Film Heritage Ass'n; Moviecraft, Inc.; Dover Publications, Inc.; and
Copyright's Commons. See Appellant's Petition, infra note 9, at i1
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101, 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303 and 304).
8 U.S. CONST. amend. I (the First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....").
' SeeAppellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17-24, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (No. 01-618), availabl at LEXIS No. 01-618, 2001 U.S. Briefs 618 (Oct. 11, 2001)
[hereinafter Appellant's Petition] (arguing that the CTEA's retroactive aspect violates the "limited
times" requirement of the copyright clause).
'0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8 (granting Congress the power "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Tunes to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
See Appellant's Petition, seepra note 9, at 10-17.
12 See Brief of Amici Curiae Copyright Law Professors at 3-7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372
(D.C.Cir. 2001) (No. 01-618), avaiabkat LEXIS No. 01-618,2001 U.S. Briefs 618 (Nov. 26,2001).
See also Brief of Amici Curiae Jack M. Balkin, Yochai Benkler, Bert Neubome, and Jed Rubenfeld
at 1-3, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No.01-618), aailabkat http://supreme.1p.
findlaw.com/supreme-court/docket/2002/october.html (last visited Oct 20, 2002) (offering
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Despite the court's dismissal of First Amendment arguments regarding copyright
law, there is a growing body of legal scholarship arguing that copyright can and
does abridge freedom of expression on occasion. 3 Moreover, the-Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals recently made a strong case for First Amendment rights
in relation to copyright law when it recognized the need to protect a defendant's
fair use to parody a copyrighted work. 4
CTEA supporters counter that far from inhibiting First Amendment concerns,
term extensions will encourage creative expression."5 This argument alludes to the
Supreme Court's assertion in Harper Rw,
w Publishers,Inc. v.Nation Enteqrisesthat
copyright serves as an "engine of free expression."' 6 The Court theorized that
without limited monopoly protection for authors, fewer works would be
produced, thus lessening the availability of original works that promote progress. 7
Proponents of the CTEA also observe that the legislation serves the rational
perspectives of constitutional law professors in support of petitioner).
13 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copynght.Within the FirstAmendment Skin, 54 STAN.
L REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that copyright's speech-burdening effects should be subject to more
exacting First Amendment scrutiny than the courts have accorded thus far); Lawrence Lessig,
Copght'sFirstAmendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001) (discussing the history of copyright and
the role of the First Amendment in that history); Yochai Benlder, FreeattheAirto Common Use: First
Amendment Constraint on Enclosre of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) (asserting that
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code,
and the Collections of Information Antipiracy Act present troubling challenges to First Amendment
principles); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofSpeech and Injunctionsin InteldectualProperty
Case, 48 DuKE L.J. 147 (1998) (noting that intellectual property rights, unlike other property rights,
are a form of government-imposed, content-based speech restriction); Stephen Fraser, The Conflict
Between the FirstAmendment and CopynghtLaw andIts Impact on the Internet, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1 (1998) (examining the relationship between copyright's purposes and the First Amendment,
and the impact of the Internet on that relationship); and Ann Brill
& Ashley Packard, Silendng
Sdientologv's Criticson the Internet: A Mission Impossible?, 19 COMM. & L.1 (1997) (discussing the First
Amendment and copyright law implications of the Church of Scientology's efforts to halt
dissemination of its doctrines via the Internet).
" SeeSuntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1652
(N.D. Ga. 2001), rev'd, 268 F.3d 1257,1276,60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1240 (11 th Cir.2001), rehg
denied, 275 F.3d 58 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (recognizing Alice Randall's "The Wind Done Gone"
as a parody of "Gone With the Wind" written from the viewpoint of a slave with the specific
intention of refuting the stereotypes in Margaret Mitchell's original novel. When Mitchell's heirs
sued Randall's publisher for copyright infringement, a Georgia district court preliminarily enjoined
the book's publication under the theory that it was likely to interfere with the market for the original
work. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, describing the injunction as "at odds with the shared
principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law [and] acting as a prior restraint on

speech."). Id
'sSee S.REP.No. 104-315, at 10 (1996) (statement of the Committee of theJudiciary concluding
that copyright extensions would serve as an intergenerational incentive to produce more work).
16 471 U.S. 539, 558, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073, 1080 (1985).
17Id
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purpose of bringing U.S. term limits for copyright protection in line with
proposed European Union term limits, facilitating trade.18
Opponents of the Act believe it not only violates the spirit of the Constitution's Copyright Clause but also the original intent of the framers, many of whom
passed the first copyright statute that protected creative works for only 14 years."9
Considering that this is the eleventh term extension in forty years, 20 opponents
point out that Congress seems to be pursuing a course of extension by degrees
until works are protected in perpetuity.21 They note that if the purpose of limited
protection of works is to provide authors with an incentive to create, an additional
twenty years is unlikely to provide much added incentive prospectively and
absolutely none retrospectively.
They also argue that copyright's First
Amendment justification as an engine of free expression is valid only so long as
it serves that purpose, and that by keeping works out of the public domain for
longer periods, Congress is denying the public access to the very building blocks
upon which progress in arts and science is supposed to be based.'

's

See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The ConstitutionahiyofCoprghtTerxtenuion: How Lon Is Too Long?,

18 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. UJ. 651,690-92 (2000).
"SSee Hannibal Travis, Comment, Piraitesof the InformationInfrastatur: BaktonianCoryigbt and

the FirstAendment,15 BERcELEYTECH.

UJ. 777,813-15 (2000).
20 See Pub. L. No. 87-668,76 Stat. 555 (1962); Pub. L No. 89-142,79 Stat. 581 (1965); Pub. L.

No. 90-141,81 Stat. 464 (1967); Pub. L No. 90-416,82 Stat. 397 (1968); Pub. L No. 91-147,83 Stat.
360 (1969); Pub. L No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 (1971); Pub.
L No. 92-566,86 Stat. 1181 (1972); Pub. L No. 93-573, Tide I, § 104,88 Stat. 1873 (1974); Pub. L
No. 94-553, S 304,90 Stat. 2572 (1976); Pub. L No. 105-298, S 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). In
contrast, during copyright's first 150-year period, there were only two term extensions. Act of Feb.
2,1831, SS 1-2,4 Stat. 36, and Act of Mar. 4, 1909, S 4,35 Stat. 1075, 1076.
21 See Fendng Cop rilhtProtections:Hearingson S. 4839, The CopyrghtTerm Extension Act of 1995,
Before the Senate Jididaty Comm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Prof. Peter Jaszi,
Washington College of Law, American University), avlabkat 1995 WL 1052-4355 (commenting that
Congress, using the practice of extending the term of subsisting copyrights without limits, could
achieve perpetual copyright protection "on the installment plan"). See also Christina N. Gifford,
Note, The Sonny Bono Copynght Tem Exteion Act, 30 U. MEM. L REv. 363,398 (2000) ('If history
repeats itself, the owners of these copyrights will lobby Congress for a third term extension in 2018,
just as they did for the first time in the 1970s and again in the 1990s.'); Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at
382 (Sentenelle,J. dissenting in part).
" See Gifford, smpra note 21, at 383 ('Due to the enactment of the CTEA, no new works will
fall into the public domain until the year 2018. This fact is of great concern to many institutions
such as libraries and archives that depend on works in the public domain for a large part of their
collections.").
' See Jane C. Ginsburg, CoqyightLWgifationforthe 'ihgital]Wlknnitm" 23 COLUM.-VLAJ.L&
ARTS 137, 171 (1999) (extending protection of existing works "cannot enhance the quantum of
creativity from the past, but it can compromise the creativity of the future, by delaying for twenty
years the time at which subsequent authors may freely build on these works').
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This Article considers whether the petitioners in the case have raised a
legitimate First Amendment issue, and if so, what a valid First Amendment
argument for protecting the public domain might be. Part I of this Article
describes the CTEA and the case that challenges it; Part II considers whether
First Amendment analysis is warranted; Part III sketches the contours of the
public domain; and Part IV examines the public domain's intertextual relationship
to freedom of expression.
II. THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT AND ELDRED V.AsHCROFT
Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act and the
president signed it into law in October of 1998.24 The Act was named for its
original sponsor who died in a skiing accident that year. The CTEA's primary
purpose was to amend the 1976 Copyright Act, extending terms for copyright
protection by an additional twenty years.2s
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyrighted works were protected for the
extent of their creators' lifetimes plus fifty years.26 Congress enacted the 1976
Copyright Act to bring the United States into compliance with the Berne
Convention International Copyright Agreement.' The treaty mandates that all
member nations protect copyrights for a minimum period of life plus fifty years.
To comply with the treaty, the United States lengthened domestic copyright term
limits and eliminated requirements for registration or official copyright notice on
protected works.as
The CTEA amended section 302 of the Copyright Act to extend the duration
of copyright in a work created on or afterJanuary 1, 1978, to a term equal to the
lifespan of the author plus seventy years." In the case of jointly created works,
the term now extends seventy years beyond the death of the last surviving
author." The CTEA extended the duration of copyright in anonymous or
pseudonymous works or works made for hire from the original seventy-five-year
24 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827

(1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 108, 203(a)(2), 301(r), 302, 303 and 304).
s In addition to term extensions, the CTEA also amended or added to the 1976 Copyright Act

in three other respects by altering transfer rights, providing a new infringement exception, and
clarifying congressional recommendations for division of fees related to audiovisual works.
2 17 U.S.C. § 105, 302(a) (Supp. 1977).
SBerne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, revised
Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341. The Berne Convention is the oldest international agreement
protecting copyrighted works. The United States joined the Berne Convention in 1989.
21 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(codified at 17 U.S.C. % 101-04,116, 301,401-02, 404-08, 801 (1988)) [hereinafter Berne].
2 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act S 102(b)(1).
30 Id § 102(b)(2).
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term of protection to ninety-five years from the date of first publication, or 120
years from the year of creation, whichever expires first."
Under Section 303 of the 1976 Act, works that were not published or
registered before January 1, 1978 were destined to fall into the public domain on
or before December 31, 2002.32 But if such a work were published before the
2002 deadline, then it would receive protection until2027."3 The CTEA extended
that term of protection until 2047.3' The CTEA also amended Section 304 of the
Copyright Act to lengthen the renewal term for works created before 1978,
extending the total length of protection for such works from seventy-five to
ninety-five years from the date the original copyright was secured.35
Several justifications have been put forward for the legislation, suggesting that
it provides additional encouragement to create, adjusts copyright protection to
correspond to increased life expectancy and encourages the preservation of older
works. But the primary reason sponsors gave for supporting the bill was to
ensure that U.S. intellectual property remained competitive abroad, particularly in
terms of trade within the European Economic Union. Arguing for term
extensions, Senator Orrin Hatch said, "[Alt a time when we face trade deficits in
many other areas, we cannot afford to abandon twenty years' worth of valuable
overseas protection now available to our creators and copyright owners." 36
Hatch and other proponents of the legislation were responding to pressures
to alter U.S. copyright term limits to conform to those set by the European
Union. In 1993, the EU's Council of Ministers issued a directive, requiring
members of the Union to harmonize their individual laws for copyright
protection.37 The directive specified that the duration of copyright protection
within the European Union would be equal to the life of the author plus seventy
years.3 8 Because the Berne Convention's standard of protection is considered a
minimum requirement, some European Union countries had adopted longer
terms of protection. 9 The directive also altered the standard of protection
European Union nations could offer nonmember works, including those from the
United States. Up until that point, EU nations had two options regarding the
length of protection they could offer U.S. works in their countries. They could

11Id § 102(b)(3).
32

17 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. 1977).

33 Id

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act S 102(c).

35 See id § 102(d) (1) (B).
3
31

141 CONG. REC. S3391 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
SeeJenny Dixon, The CoqpightTerm ExtenuionAct: Is Life PlurSeven!, Too Much?, 18 HASTINGS

COMM. ENT. UJ. 945, 968 (1996) (citing Council Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290)).
38 Id
39

Id at 969.
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offer U.S. works the same duration of protection they gave to their own works
and those of other EU nations; or, they could protect U.S. works for the length
of time specified by U.S. copyright law. The Council of Ministers' directive
announced that, with respect to non-EU works, member nations would now
follow the rule of the shorter term."0
Applying the rule of the shorter term meant that European Union nations
would protect member nations' works for the life of the author plus seventy years,
but U.S. works would only be protected for the life of the author plus fifty years,
the term length established by the 1976 Copyright Act. Intellectual property is
one of the United States' main exports.4 Fear of losing twenty years of returns
on intellectual property became the driving impetus to enact the Copyright Term
Extension Act. 2
Professor Arthur Miller has pointed out that Congress undoubtedly had a
rational reason to extend term limits-harmonization of our laws with those of
European Union nations that are large consumers of American intellectual
property. 43 However, opponents to term extensions argue that the United States
does not need to revamp its copyright system to meet the demands of other
nations."4 The United States has traditionally resisted international rules that
would alter the domestic balance between author and societal rights to intellectual
property. 4' A prime example of this is U.S. refusal to comply with the Berne

' Id at 970-71.
41See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 10 (1998) (statement of the Committee on the Judiciary; in the
report, relating to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, the Senate noted that according
to International Intellectual Property Alliance, in 1996 U.S. copyright industries achieved foreign
sales and exports of $60 billion, for the first time leading all major industry sectors. U.S. creative
industries accounted for 3.65% of the U.S. gross domestic product-278.4 billion).
42 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (statement of the Committee on the Judiciary that
"U.S. works will generally be protected for the same amount of time as works created by European
Union authors. Therefore, the United States will ensure that profits generated from the sale of U.S.
intellectual property abroad will come back to the United States."); The Copyqight Term ExtensionAct
of 1995: Hearingson S.483 Before the SenateJutdidayComm., 104th Cong. 4 (1995) (serial numberJ-10446) (statement of Sen. Feinstein observing that "[plerhaps the most compelling reason for this
legislation is the need for greater international harmonization of copyright terms").
13Miller, irpranote 18, at 700.
See Copmyht Term, Film Labehng and Film PresevationL-giraio: The Copy"ght Trm Extension
Act, Hearingson H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and IntelkctualProp. of the House Comm. on the
Juadar, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 290-94 (statement of Professor Dennis Karjala) [hereinafter House
Subcomm. Hearings].
s For example, the first copyright statute gave no protection to foreign works. Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. The policy continued for more than acentury. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch.
565, 26 Stat. 1106, 1110 (extending copyright protection to foreigners if the same protection was
extended to the United States). Also, it was not until the United States became a member of the
Berne Convention in 1988-102 years after it was originally implemented, that the United States
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Convention's mandate that member nations recognize authors' moral rights in
intellectual property. Under a moral rights theory, authors' rights are primary.
Under this theory "copyright is a natural property right that the author obtains by
virtue of the labor he or she has expended to create the artistic or literary work.""
Even after selling the economic rights in a work, the author preserves the moral
rights to protect the work from "any distortion, mutilation, or any other
modification which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. '" As
a signatory to the Berne Convention, the United States is obligated to protect
authors' moral rights (something U.S. copyright has traditionally not done), but
has skirted the issue by concluding that current domestic laws, such as unfair
competition, defamation, privacy and contract law, adequately protect authors'
work." A moral rights system arguably would interfere with our own copyright
system's basic tenet that copyrights are not a natural property right but a
monopoly right secured for limited times to promote progress. CTEA opponents
note that a similar argument could be made about the twenty-year term
extension-that while it might be suitable for countries that view copyright as a
natural property right, it is not appropriate for one that views copyright as a
limited monopoly that ultimately serves the public welfare.49
From an economic perspective, the Act's opponents also argue that the market
for U.S. intellectual property traded abroad is likely to be at its height during the
early stage of a work's lifetime, not after a span the length of the life of the author
plus seventy years.' Their assumption is that the social costs of depriving the
public domain of any new works until the year 2018 are unlikely to justify the
potential benefit to copyright holders who profit from term extensions.
Of course, as more than one commentator on this issue has observed, there
is no empirical data to show that creators would strongly benefit from term
extensions; nor is there any data regarding the impact that closing off the public
domain for twenty years would have on the development of creative works.st The
conclusion one draws depends on the theoretical perspective one takes when
approaching the issue.
The Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the CTEA this fall,
when it reviews Eldredv. Ashaioft. The case comes to the Court on appeal from

agreed to eliminate the requirement for registration to protect copyrights. (See Berne, spranote 28.)
46 Dixon, .rupranote 37, at 965.
47 Id at 967.
4See
id at 967.
49 See Homse Sxbcomm. Hearings, uom note 44, at 290-94 (statement of Professor Dennis Karala).
so See Gifford, spranote 21, at 392 (noting that, in reality, term extension has no effect on the
demand for U.S. works).
51See Dixon, s ra note 37, at 979.Jessica Litman, The Pub cDomain, 39 EMoRYLJ. 965,997-98
(1990).
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the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In upholding the CTEA, the
appeals court formed two conclusions: 1) that Congress is not bound by the
introductory language in the Constitution's Copyright Clauses. and 2) that the
53
Copyright Clause is immune from First Amendment challenges.
Petitioners in the case had argued that Congress overstepped the bounds of
the Copyright Clause, which grants Congress the power "to promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," ' by enacting term
extensions that were not limited and therefore did not promote progress."5 But
the appeals court refused to acknowledge that Congress is bound by the clause's
"promote progress" preamble.' Referring to its earlier ruling in Schnapper v.
FoL, s7 the appeals court restated its position that the introductory language places
no limits on congressional power to enact copyright legislation. 8 Relying on a
more literal interpretation of the clause, the court pointed out that the new term
is limited in the sense that protection does
not carry on in perpetuity and
59
therefore is within Congress's power to set.
The court of appeals also rejected petitioners' argument that the CTEA should
fail because originality is a requirement of copyright protection under the
Copyright Act, and extending the term lengths of already protected works does
not meet that requirement. The court said "originality is by its nature a threshold
inquiry relevant to copyrightability, not a continuing concern relevant to the
authority of the Congress to extend the term of a copyright." The question of
originality in relation to copyrighted texts, or any text for that matter, is one that
is debated in both literary and legal scholarship and one that has larger implications for the public domain to be discussed later in this Article."
What is particularly significant about the case in terms of communication law,
however, is the appeals court's treatment of the petitioners' First Amendment
challenge. More than simply dismissing the value of the petitioners' arguments
about the effect of term extensions on free expression, the court made the
surprising statement that "copyrights are categorically immune from challenges

s2See Edrd, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

s3See id at 375.
54 U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, d. 8.

55

See Eldred,239 F.3d at 377-78.

at 378.
11667 F.2d 102,112,212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
"6 See id

"' Btsee Eldred 239 F.3d at 383 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the language in
Schnapperwas not a holding the Circuit Court need follow, but "simply dicta").
"' See EUmd,239 F.3d at 377-78.
60Id at 380.
61 See infra notes

139-93 and accompanying text
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under the First Amendment., 6 2 The D.C. Circuit Court based this conclusion on
3 and the Supreme Court's
its own earlier opinion in United Video, Inc. v. F.C.C."
holding in Harper& Row Pubisherr,Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,' which the court of
appeals interpreted to provide First Amendment "immunity" for copyright
legislation."'
III. IS A FIRST AMENDMENT REVIEW WARRANTED?

In a recent copyright case, the Eleventh Circuit stated that "the public interest
is always served in promoting First Amendment values and in preserving the
public domain from encroachment.""' While a few courts have appeared to
recognize the potentially negative implications that aspects of copyright law have
had on freedom of expression, 7 historically most courts have been reluctant to
acknowledge a conffict between copyright law and the First Amendment. Many
have found that copyright's capacity to restrict speech is ameliorated by the
doctrine of fair use, which gives secondary writers and artists the right to use
limited portions of a work for the purposes of comment, criticism, reporting and
scholarship.68 Others have found that copyright's idea/expression dichotomy
protects FirstAmendment concerns by allowing secondary writers to use the facts
62 Edred,239 F.3d at 375.

890 F.2d 1173, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 964 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
64 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
65 See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 375 (describing the two cases as "insuperable bars to plaintiffs' first
amendment theory").
' Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001), rw'd,252 F.3d
1165, 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001).
67 See Triangle Publ'ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 198 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 28 (S.D. Fla. 1978), affdon othergnrndr,626 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1980); New Era Publ'ns Int'l
v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J.,
concurring) (stating that imposing a permanent injunction in the copyright case would "diminish
public knowledge" creating first amendment concerns); and Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,327-33,55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1873 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying first
amendment analysis to provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, but finding no
63

conflict).
" See, e.g., Roy Exp. Co. v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (2d Cir.
1982) ('No circuit that has considered the question ... has ever held that the First Amendment
provides a privilege in the copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use'
doctrine.'); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1729
(9th Cir. 2001) ("First Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by the presence of the fair use
doctrine.'); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that the Copyright Act balances First Amendment concerns with the
rights of copyright holders); Chli Sch. Reform Bd. of Tr. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1623 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (refusing to let a paper print copies of standardized tests
to raise public debate on the subject).
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and ideas of a primary writer without appropriating the exact wording used to
express the facts and ideas. 9
In fact, in reaching the conclusion that copyright law cannot implicate the First
Amendment, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals based its analysis, in part, on the
idea/expression dichotomy." It cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Hapr
Row to conclude that copyright law was immune from First Amendment
challenges, but the court of appeals seems to have misread that decision. In
Harper & Row, Nation Enterprises asked the Court to craft a public figure
exception to copyright to shield The Nation magazine, which quoted from former
President Gerald Ford's unpublished memoirs. Refusing to do so, the Court
explained that copyright has built-in First Amendment protections-fair use and
the idea expression dichotomy-that normally preserve the First Amendment
interests of secondary writers." The Court never said, however, that copyright
was immune from First Amendment challenges.
The theory behind the idea/expression dichotomy is generally credited to
Melville Nimmer who in 1970 wrote an influential law review article about the
potential conflict between the First Amendment's dictate that "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech" and the Copyright Act's
regulation of speech.72 Nimmer theorized that conflicting interests could be
accommodated with definitional balancing.73 Under this balancing approach, ideas
would fall on the free speech side of the line, while the specific statement of the
idea-its form-would fall on the copyright side of the line. While acknowledging the existence of some speech interest in the actual expression of an idea,

" See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (stating

that First Amendment protections are "already embodied inthe Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas"); Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170, 196 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (9th Cir. 1977)

(concluding "the idea-expression dichotomy already serves to accommodate the competing interests
of copyright and the first amendment. The 'marketplace of ideas'is not limited by copyright because
copyright islimited to protection of expression."); United Video, Inc. v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173,1191,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1964 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ('Although there is some tension between the

Constitution's copyright clause and the first amendment, the familiar idea/expression dichotomy of
copyright law, under which ideas are free but their particular expression can be copyrighted, has
always been held to give adequate protection to free expression."); and Iowa State Univ. Research
Found. v. ABC, 621 F.2d 57, 61,207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The public interest in the
free flow of information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts.").
70 Edd 239 F.3d at 375-76.
71 Haperc)&RaowPubfhrs,471 U.S. at 556 ("[Cjopyright's idea/expression dichotomy 'strike[s]
a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free

communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression."') (citations omitted).
72 Melville Nimmer, Dots CopyrightAbridge the FirstAmaendment Guarantiesof Free Speech
and the
Press?,17 UCLA L REv. 1180,1181-86 (1970).
" See id at 1188-89.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

11

Journal of Intellectual
Vol. 10,
J.Property
INTELLLaw,
PROP.
L Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 2 [Vol. 10:1

Nimmer theorized that the speech interest did not supercede copyright's interest
in encouraging creativity as long as ideas remained accessible to everyone. 74 But
Nimmer also balanced this approach by stating that after a certain period of time,
the copyright interest in a work would decline while the speech
interest remained
76
constant.7 s At that point, the speech interest should prevail.
Nimmer recognized that under certain circumstances copyright could pose
constraints on freedom of expression that were not mitigated by the ideaexpression dichotomy, such as when the particular form of expression might be
crucial to convey a message7 7 This, he said, is particularly true where visual
works, such as photographs and films, are concerned. He used as an example the
Zapruder film of President John F. Kennedy's assassination/a Two years after
Nimmer wrote his article, another image captured the world's attention and
arguably altered American sentiment for the Vietnam War-Nick Ut's Pulitzer
Prize winning photo of nine-year-old Kim Phuc covered with napalm. Nimmer
proposed an exception to copyright in cases in which newsworthiness was an
issue.79 Similar exceptions exist in the areas of defamation and privacy law, but
courts have accepted no such exception for copyright.' Fair use is intended to
fulfill that purpose. But scholars have lamented its efficacy in that area and
pointed to its chilling effects."s Nimmer also pointed to insufficient protection
for speech that may ensue from over-reliance on the fair use doctrine. He noted
that "The scope and extent of fair use falls within the discretion of the Congress.
The limitations of the First Amendment are imposed upon Congress itself." 2
Nimmer also expressed concern over then pending legislation that would
lengthen the term of copyright on works already protected under the law. 3 He
argued that retrospective term extensions burdened free speech without providing

14Seeid at 1193.
75See id
76

See id

7

See id at 1197.

71See id at 1197-98.
79Seeid at 1198-99.

o In fact, in Harper & Row, the defendants tried to persuade the Court that such an exception
was warranted without success. See Harper,471 U.S. at 556 ('Respondents advance the substantial
public import of the subject matter of the Ford memoirs as grounds for excusing a use that would
ordinarily not pass muster as a fair use.").
stSee, eg.,
Matthew D. Bunker, ErodingFair Use: The 'Tran ormative" Use DoarineAfter Campbell,
7 CoMM. L.& POL'Y 1 (2002); Keith Aoki, Amthors, Inventors
and Trademark Owners: PrivateIntelketal
Prapetr andthe Pmblic Domain, 18 COLUM-VLAJ.L & ARTS I (Part 1) (1993).
' Nimmer, supra note 72, at 1200 ('Iwould suggest that a grave danger to copyright may lie in
the failure to distinguish between the statutory privilege known as fair use and an emerging
constitutional limitation on copyright contained in the first amendment.").
8 Seeid at 1194-95.
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additional incentives to create because the works were already in existence." He
added, "I can but conclude that a serious question exists as to the constitutional
validity of the proposed extension, given the countervailing interests in free
speech."' s He also suggested that the Constitution's mandate to "promote the
progress of science and the useful arts" might render retrospective term
extensions beyond Congress' power u
Several commentators have noted similarities between Nimmer's warning
against retrospective term extensions and the potential impact of the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act.87 But in Edrrdv. Rene, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeal appeared oblivious to Nimmer's concern as it cited Justice Brennan in
Ha'per & Row, citing Nimmer, to conclude that copyright's idea-expression
dichotomy rendered the statute invulnerable to First Amendment challenges.8
However, while Nimmer warned against perpetual copyrights and retrospective extensions, he did not oppose prospective extensions.89 In fact, when he
wrote his article, Congress was contemplating a copyright term extension from
fifty-six years to life plus fifty years to comply with the Berne Convention. The
prospective extension granted by the CTEA is not so different from the Berne
Convention extension in that it also attempts to align U.S. copyright terms with
copyright protection offered by other nations. Viewed in terms of global trade,
copyright term extensions appear to make economic sense.
Without a larger issue, such as freedom of speech, to trigger heightened
scrutiny, the Supreme Court is likely to defer to congressional reasoning rather
than question whether the means Congress employed to serve trade will actually
lead to the ends desired. It is precisely for this reason that the question of
whether copyright term extensions violate the First Amendment is important to
the Supreme Court's analysis of this legislation. The CTEA is a content-neutral
law-, it was not imposed for the purpose of restricting speech based on its
communicative impact. If the Supreme Court opts to apply First Amendment
analysis to the CTEA, it will likely examine the law using the heightened scrutiny
test for content-neutral legislation. The Court will have to determine whether the
CTEA furthers an important government interest and, if so, whether the

" See id at 1195 ('It can hardly be argued that an author's creativity is encouraged by such an
extension, since the work for which the term is extended has already been created.").
8IId at 1195.
See id at 1195 ('Though the language is not conclusive, it strongly suggests that the proposed
extension of existing copyrights... is beyond the Congress' copyright power, quite apart from its
possible invalidity by reason of the first amendment.').
See, e.g., Benkler, mpra note 13, at 386-87; and Netanel, spra note 13, at 71.
"Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 375 (citing Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539, 556 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted)).
" Nimmer, smpra note 72, at 1195.
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legislation is narrowly tailored to further that interest.9" In other words,
heightened scrutiny would demand that the Court determine whether the
government's goal of extending term limits prospectively and retrospectively to
bring U.S. laws in line with European law warrants the legislation's attendant
impact on expression.
In performing this analysis, the Court need not reach a final determination on
the legislation's constitutionality. It may simply remand the case with instructions
to the court below to review the case under heightened scrutiny. But in either
case, it will be difficult to determine what the balance should be without a better
understanding of what the public domain is, how it functions and what its
relationship is to free expression. The rest of this Article focuses on these
questions.
IV. WHAT IS THE PUBLIC DOMAIN?
A. DRAWING 11S BOUNDARIES

The public domain sits at the opposite end of the intellectual property scale.
It is the counterweight to intellectual property, the body of work and knowledge
that is characterized by "rights held in common over information, as opposed to
the individual rights granted in a positive and defined form by the different
branches of intellectual property law."' The term intellectual property encompasses three separate areas of law with different theories: copyright, patent and
trademark law. In assigning protection to various expressive works, processes
and inventions, and distinctive terms and symbols, each area of law places
information into a proprietary realm. Information that falls outside of this
proprietary realm is assumed to be in the public domain.
While trademark law finds its origins in common law, intended to prevent
consumer confusion in the marketplace, copyright and patent law draw their force
from the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to protect intellectual
property "to promote progress. ,92 The common understanding of the copyright
and patent clause is that protection of intellectual property will serve as an
economic incentive to encourage individuals to produce more work, thereby
contributing to the progress of science and the arts, which in turn benefits the

' See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) ("A content-neutral regulation will
be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests unrelated
to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests.") (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
91John Frow, Pmbic Doaain and Colkctwe Rights in C~tarn, 13 INTELL. PROP. J. 39, 39-40 (1998).
92 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cd. 8.
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general public welfare.93 Thus, copyright law is intended to balance the interests
of two competing parties-the creators, who have an economic interest in the
preservation of the work, and the general public, which has an interest in access
to those works.' In fact, between the two competing parties, it could even be
argued that the rights of the public are the stronger, or at least should be."' In
UnitedStates v. ParamountPictures, the Supreme Court said "copyright law, like the
patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."96
While there is no legal definition for public domain in any statute and courts
have been reluctant to pin down its borders, the public domain has been
recognized as worthy of protection. In SunTrust Bank v. Hougbton Min Co., the
Eleventh Circuit said: "The Copyright Clause was intended 'to be the engine of
free expression.' To that end, copyright laws have been enacted to achieve three
main goals: the promotion of learning, the protection of the public domain, and
'
the granting of an exclusive right to the author."97
In terms of copyright, legal theorists generally agree on three categories of
works that belong to the public domain: 1) works that were previously protected
by copyright, but whose copyright protection has expired; 2) works that were
never protected by copyright, such as those produced by the federal government 8
and those that lack the criteria for copyright such as fixation or originality;" and
3) and works that, although deserving of copyright protection, have fallen into the
public domain because their creators have allowed them to, either purposely or
by accident.
To this description of the public domain, three other categories also can be
attributed. These are not categories of creative works, per se, but rather building
13 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156,
186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65
(1975) ("The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright
duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
.See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429,220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
665 (1984) ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor

primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant isa means by which

an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.").
9 Set United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. et al., 334 U.S. 131,158,77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243

(1948).
96

Id

9 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (citations omitted).

17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
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blocks for creative works. The first, and most important, is made up of facts,

which are not copyrightable. In Feist Pubications v. Rural Teephone Service Co.,
Justice Sandra O'Connor explained that facts cannot be copyrighted "because

facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one
between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular

fact has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.""
Also included in this' category are ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods
of operation, concepts, principles, or discoveries, regardless of the form in which
they are described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.0 1
The second category includes scenes a faire. Judge Leon Yankwich, who sat
on the federal district court for the Southern District of California, introduced the
French literary term, meaning a scene "which 'must' be done," into U.S. copyright
case law in the early 1940s.' 2 Judge Yankwich explained that scenes a faire "are
the common stock of literary composition-'cliches'-to which no one can claim
literary ownership."1 3 Using the example of a couple seeking shelter from a
storm in a church, he said, "[c]ourts have held repeatedly that such similarities and
incidental details necessary to the environment or setting of an action are not the
material of which copyrightable originality consists.""
The third category, which is somewhat more controversial, is that area of
copyrighted work that is protected but would fall under the privilege of fair use.
The fair use doctrine entitles individuals who ordinarily would not have the right
to use copyrighted material without the permission of the owner to use small
portions of a copyrighted work for the purpose of "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching. . ., scholarship, or research."'0 5 Some commentators argue
that because it is generally permissible to make fair use of small portions of a
work, those uses fall into the public domain."°

'oo
499 U.S. 340, 347, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1275 (1991) (citing 1 M. & D. Nimmer, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT S 2.11(A), at 2-157 (1990)).
10117 U.S.C. S102(b) (2000).
102Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270,275, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 153, 157 (S.D.
Cal. 1945).
103 Id at 278.
"'0
Cain v. Universal Pictures Co., 47 F. Supp. 1013, 1017, 56 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 8, 11 (S.D. Cal.
1942). Se alto
Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87,91,190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 387,
391 (2d Cir. 1976) (concluding the use of stereotypical settings is non-infringing), al. ided, 429 U.S.
980,191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 64 (1976); Bradbury v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 733,745,
123 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1959), mv'd, 287 F.2d 478, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 376 (9th Cir.
1961), art. dtmissed, 368 U.S. 801 (1961).
10s
17 U.S.C. S 107 (2000).
106See Benkler, suVra note 13, at 363 ('Uses of information commonly perceived as permissible
absent special circumstances, such as a brief quotation in a critical review or lending a book to a
friend, fall within the functional definition of the public domain."); Bunker, stura note 81, at 22
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B. A POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE CREATION?

Some legal theorists have refuted the proposition that the public domain is a
positive creation at all. In his discussion of the public domain, Edward Samuels
07
describes the public domain as "the 'negative' of whatever may be protected.'
It is the sum total of what is leftover after protected works are accounted for and
therefore not really capable of serving as a public policy or legal principle with a
life of its own."8 Moreover, Samuels argues that many of the limitations on the
scope of copyright protection attributed to the growth of the public domain were
really "created in response to major copyright expansions, and are therefore
ultimately part of copyright's expanding scope."' 9
At the other end of the spectrum there are legal scholars who not only see the
public domain as a positive entity, but who have attempted to map it and its
adjacent terrain. "' Pamela Samuelson suggests that the public domain is akin to
its own nation-state and that various categories of public domain information are
regions of that nation."' In her visual diagram, one state is allocated for "ideas,
concepts, discoveries, theories, [and] hypotheses" and another for "facts,
information, data, know-how, [and] knowledge."". Others are established for
government materials, innovations involving intellectual property protection in
which no rights were claimed or rights have expired, and innovations not
qualifying for intellectual property protection."' Some of the residents in these
115
states have more than one home,"' and property lines are subject to change.
As Samuelson points out, the public domain varies in size and scope, changing
with the passage of new laws, legal interpretations of established law, and

('The fair use of any work is always and already in the public domain.").
107 Edward Samuels, The Pubic Domain in Copy/gLai,41 J.COPYRIGHTSOC'Y 137,137 (1993).
logSee id
109Id at 144. See aso M. William Krasilovsky, Obsen'ationson Pbhlk Domain,14 BULL. COPYRIGHT

Soc'Y 205, 205 (1967) (observing that the public domain "is best defined in negative terms').
1o Pamela Samuelson, Digstal Information, DigitalNeltork., and The Pnhic Domain, 68 J.L &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming Autumn 2002) (manuscript at 84, presented Nov. 10, 2001 at the
Conference of the Public Domain), at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (last visited Oct.
7, 2002).
111
Id (manuscript at 83).
112 Id (manuscript at 84).
"'See id (manuscript at 84).
...
Id (manuscript at 83).
115 Pamela Samuelson, Digital Information, Digital Networks, and the Pubikc Domain, 68 J.L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS.(forthcoming Autumn 2002) (manuscript 81-82, presented Nov. 10, 2001 at the
Conference of the Public Domain), at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (last visited Oct.
7, 2002).
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additions to the public domain over time."' So, although a visual interpretation
of the public domain is conceptually help fl, it is still only an approximation that
is readily subject to change.
But if indistinct boundaries are a characteristic of the public domain, they are
also a quality of the protected domain. While there is no complete compilation of
public domain works-no database with a listing of all works freely accessible to
the public, the same statement could be made about copyrighted works. Although
the Patent and Trademark Office records copyrights that individuals register, the
listing is nowhere near complete. When the United States became a signatory to
the Berne Convention agreement, the obligation to register works for copyright
protection was removed."' Now that copyright notice, deposit and registration
are no longer required, millions of copyrighted works exist outside the government's database of protected works."'
In fact, David Lange, one of the first legal scholars to write about the public
domain, observes "that intellectual property theory must always accept something
akin to a 'no-man's land' at the boundaries."" 9 Thus, recognition of an exclusive
interest in intellectual property ought to imply an affirmative recognition of its
conceptual opposite-the public domain." Lange compared the public domain's
value with public lands subject to over grazing or the Alaskan tundra's fragile
ecosystem, suggesting that it might be prudent to require an environmental impact
statement of some kind before we permit the territory to be appropriated.' 2'
C. AN INTELLECTUAL COMMONS?

Lange is not the only theorist to analogize the public domain to real
property." The public domain is sometimes called our intellectual commons, a

Id (manuscript at 81-82).
'" One of the effects of the Berne agreement is that citizens of all its member nations enjoy full
copyright protection on their intellectual works in each of the member nations, whether or not their
works are officially registered or display an official copyright notice. See 17 U.S.C. S 408(a)
('Registration [plermissive.... Such registration is not a condition of copyright protection.").
138 See Appellanes Petition, .rpra note 9, at 9 n.5 ('Because protection is automatic and there is
no longer any requirement of renewal,... an extraordinary range of creative work now falls into a
regulatory black hole-unusable because the 'owners' of this property are unknown...").
19 David Lange, &ciz'iqgthe Pub&Fon,, 44 LAW & CONT. PROB. 147,150 (1981).
116

120See id
321 See id at 176.

", See, e.g.,James Boyle, A Poiftia ofntlktaeaIPropmy: EmirvwentairrforteNet?,47 DUKEL.J.
87, 94 (1997); Benkler, now note 13, at 354; Travis, impra note 19, at 780; and Pamela Samuelson,
The CopygbtGrab,WIRED, Jan. 1996, at 134, azalebk at http://www.wired.com/current/html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2002).
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term that alludes to the English Enclosure Movement and the history of
propertization that is part of our inherited Western European culture."'
Economic historians suggest that the enclosure movement, which fenced off
public property in fifteenth through nineteenth century England for private use,
remedied the tragedy of the commons. 24 The theory assumes that public lands
used for common consumption are generally mismanaged and underdeveloped,
and that transferring that land into the hands of a single owner provides
incentives for large-scale investment, protects the resource from over exploitation,
and generally encourages more efficient management."' A similar argument has
been applied to copyrighted materials about to enter the public domain,
suggesting that allowing copyright holders to have exclusive control over those
works for longer periods of time encourages progress, because without exclusive
control, there would be no incentive to invest in the work, market it broadly or
preserve it from deterioration."
While the tragedy of the commons theory may be applicable to shared land,
it is not applicable to the public domain because information is not a limited
resource. As literature scholar John Frow notes, "Rather than being exhausted
by use, knowledge actually increases when it is shared.""lV Where copyright is
concerned, the primary economic issue is really one of nonexclusion, meaning
that because information is not exhausted by use, the same unit can satisfy an

'23 See Travis, supra note 19, at 828 ("The ongoing copyright grab, which is being carried out on
many fronts and which will set the ground rules for speech in the Information Age, shares the
conceptual and tactical structure of the Great Enclosure ofEnglish common lands and of the efforts
of the Stationers and others to revoke public rights in the intellectual commons.");James Boyle, The
Second Encom Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 68 J. L. & CoNTEmp. PROBS.
(forthcoming Autumn 2002) (manuscript at 1, presented Nov. 10, 2001 at the Conference of the
Public Domain), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002)
(describing the enclosure movement and the fencing off of public property, as actual series of
enclosures of public lands that started in the 15th century and lasted until the 19th); and Lawrence
Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation 84 (Nov. 10, 2001) (unpublished manuscript presented at
the Conference of the Public Domain, availablk at http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers.html (last
visited Oct 20,2002)).
124 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
'a See id at 1244-45; Boyle, spranote 123, at 3.
12 See Miller, supranote 18, at 692 ("We have enormous industries that invest millions of dollars
into works of expression-from books to phonograph records, television shows, motion pictures,
and Internet systems. That is the way we disseminate copyrighted works, and thank goodness-because that enables us to disseminate not simply on Fifth Avenue and Forty-Second Street,
but to the four comers of the globe through the Internet. That takes money. It takes capital. You
must attract capital into the copyright industries or you will not achieve the purposes of the
Copyright Clause.").
'2 John Frow, Pubic Domain andthe New World Order,10 SOCIAL SEMIOTICS, 173, 182 (2000).
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infinite number of users at a marginal cost. 2 ' The challenge for copyright law
then is to provide an incentive to create the work in the first place. The law
responds to that challenge by creating a limited monopoly called an intellectual
property right.'s
But the key word here, of course, is limited Copyright is a statutory right, not
a natural right in property."
Although our founding fathers were heavily
influenced by the natural rights theory, they recognized perpetual copyright to be
a monopoly that they opposed.' They justified granting limited exclusive rights
to copyright holders on the theory that the public would eventually have access
to a greater body of knowledge, now generally understood to be the public
domain.'32
The comparison of the public domain to an intellectual commons is a doubleedged sword that can be used for varying purposes depending on who wields it.
In one sense, it reinforces the conception of copyrighted material as real property.

'28 See

Boyle, spra note 123, at 8.

129 See id

13 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 243 (1932) ('As this
Court has repeatedly said, the Congress did not sanction an existing right but created a new one.')

(citations omitted).

131SeeTravis, suranote 19, at 814 ("While the Founding Fathers generally supported a copyright
law premised on natural rights and instrumental arguments, this support was accompanied by a
historical mistrust of monopoly, thought to be a source of innumerable inefficiencies and
oppressions.... Madison sought to balance the rights of authors, and the encouragement of writing,
with the principle, widespread by that time, that 'perpetual monopolies of every sort are
forbidden .... by the genius of free governments.' Even those limited monopolies granted to
authors and inventors must be 'guarded with strictness against abuse.'") (citing James Madison,
Monwpohes, Prpetitis,Corporations,Ecetislcal Endowments, in Aspectr of Monopob One Hunded Years
Ago, HARPER'S MAG., Mar. 1914, at 490 (published posthumously)); butseeGinsburg, infranote 192,
at 696 (' To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' could be considered to be an
instrumental objective. But Congress has also said 'by securing for limited Times to Authors.' I do
not understand the term 'by securing' to mean to grant something that wasn't there before, but
rather, to reinforce a pre-existing right Indeed, that pre-existing right was acknowledged by
Madison's justification for the Copyright Clause in Federalist 43, when-referring not to Donaldson
v.Beckett but to Millar v. Taylor-Madison said that copyright had been adjudged in England as
a right at common law. It is true that Donaldson v. Beckett [which overruled Miller v. Taylor] had,
I think, already been decided when Madison made this declaration, but it seems that the news did
not make it across the Atlantic by the time that Madison wrote his contribution to the Federalist
papers. Thus, he was referring to the other traditional view of copyright law.").
"3 SeeTravis, snranote 19, at 813-14 ('The Copyright Clause effectively constitutionalized the

rule announced in [the English case] Donaldsonthat perpetual common-law copyright does not exist.
Later, the Copyright Act of 1790 provided for a 14 year term from the time of prepublication filing
of a copy with the local United States District Court, and gave the author (and apparently only the
author) the right to renew the right for an additional 14 years. Thus, the work 'fell' into the public
domain after 14 years if the author died or failed to renew in time, and after 28 years if he or she
lived and renewed the right.").
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Real property carries with it the notion of perpetual ownership and restrictions
of use based on scarcity of resources. In another sense, characterizing the public
domain as an intellectual commons may also allow individuals to conceptualize
the public domain as a common resource that is worthy of protection.
Recognizing a conceptual difficulty in coming to grips with the concept of
public domain as an entity entitled to protection, James Boyle posits the need for
a new vocabulary to deal with identification of the public domain. He analogizes
the public domain to the natural environment, a concept that had to be invented
in the mind of the public before people became interested in protecting it for the
common good. 3 ' Boyle observes that the environmental movement gained

power by highlighting two structural reasons our society has traditionally made
poor choices regarding its preservation-"a legal system based on a particular
notion of what 'private property' entailed, and an engineering or scientific system
that treated the world as a simple, linearly related set of causes and effects."'" He
notes that in both of these conceptual systems, there was no place for analysis of
environmental impacts. 3 ' The environment simply disappeared. Likewise, Boyle
argues, similar structural issues impair our ability to preserve the public domain:
The fundamental tensions in the economic analysis of information
issues, the source-blindness of an 'original author' centered model
of property rights, and the political blindness to the importance of
the public domain as a whole..,
disappear, first in concept and
1 36
then, increasingly, as a reality.
In their effort to reify the environment, naturalists focused attention on the
idea of ecology-a fragile system with unpredictable interconnections, and
"welfare economics-the ways in which markets can fail to make activities
internalise [sic] their full costs. ' These issues are also present in analyses of the
impact of term extensions on the public domain among those who argue that a
rich public domain is integral to the system of creative production and that
supporting authors'
rights to the detriment of "authorship" may yield unexpected
38
social costs.

1

133 Boyle,

slpranote 123, at 39.
at 40.
Id at 40-41.

134 Id
''

136Id
137 Id
13s See

Litman, supra note 51, at 969 ('Nurturing authorship is not necessarily the same thing as
nurturing authors. When individual authors claim that they are entitled to incentives that would

impoverish the milieu in which other authors must also work, we must guard against protecting
authors at the expense of the enterprise of authorship.'); Wendy L Gordon,An Ingqiyinto theMits
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Looking at the public domain using a systems theory perspective, as Boyle and
other scholars have done, may make it easier to see how the addition of new
intellectual property laws that alter the balance between the protected and the
public domain may have an impact on the future creation of expressive works.
V. A SYSTEM APPROACH INTERTEXTUALITY AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
Our Western European conception of authorship relies on the assumption
that authors create original works. In certain respects, copyright law adopts this

view as well.'39 In fact, in Feist Pubications,Inc. v. Rura/ Telephone Service Co.,Justice
Sandra O'Connor explained that originality is "[t]he sine qua non of copyright'"and
4
"the very 'premise of copyright law.' "140However, numerous philosophers,'1
legal scholars,' and professors of communication and literature143 have pointed

of CopyaAht: The Chalenges of Consistieny, Consent, and Encouragement Theoy, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343,
1460-61 (1989) ("A strong public domain makes important contributions to a nation's cultural and
scientific health. An intellectual property system must therefore be sensitive to the needs and claims
of the nonowning public as well as those of authors.... Since authors are part of the public-and
in fact may constitute the part of the public most in need of using prior works as bricks when
building new works-it is likely that some privileges to copy will aid authors more than harm

them.').

139See Litman, supra note 51, at 965 ('Our copyright law is based on the charming notion that
authors create something from nothing.. . ."); Boyle, supra note 123, at 98-99 (observing that our
current copyright scheme lauds and encourages "the great creator"); and Travis, supra note 19, at
827.
Romantic authorship should be understood . . . as a crucial buttress to natural
rights arguments for expanded copyright. By effacing the moment of collectivity
in cultural production, it makes the labor of authors seem all the more arduous
and awe-inspiring. By casting transformative users in the role of talendess hacks,
it mobilizes the taboo against plagiarism in support of exclusive authorial rights.
But seeMark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Propent, 75 TEX. L. REV. 873,

882-84 (1997) (criticizing this argument, pointing out that the work for hire doctrine favors
corporate authors over starving artists).
'4 499 U.S. 340,345,347 (1991). Fixation and a moderate amount of creativity are the other two
characteristics of a work required for copyright protection. But see Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615,
619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845), dtedinCampbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(quotingJustice Story saying that "[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book
in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before.").
Michel Foucault, WhatlsAnAuthor?,inTHEFOUCAULTREADER 101, 118-19 (osue
'"" See, e.g.,
V. Harari trans., 1979) (Paul Rainbow ed., 1984); Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in
IMAGE/MUSIC/TEXT 142, 146 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY 8 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976).
142 See, e.g.,
Peter Jaszi, Towarda Theor ofCopynght: The Metamorphosesof 'Authorship",1991 DUKE

LJ. 455,463 (1991) (arguing that our "full-blown Romantic conception of 'authorship,"' devalues
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out that the concept of originality is elusive, considering that what all authors
"create" is actually predicated upon earlier works and influences, many of which
are found in the public domain.
Rejecting the concept of the romantic author who creates in a vacuum, some
legal scholars are employing an interdisciplinary approach to textual analysis.
They are looking beyond traditional legal reasoning and methodologies employed
by courts, to embrace theories and techniques used by post-structural literary
critics, who study intertextual relationships in their search for the social
construction of meaning.1" Intertextuality, viewedin a copyright context, appears
to suggest that the public domain has a powerful impact on expression.
The theory of intertextuality assumes that linguistic signs are differential-that
their meanings can be understood only in relation to other linguistic signs.
Likewise, the meaning of texts can be understood only in relation to other texts.
"Text," as this theory uses the term, refers to literary, visual and aural works.'
Intertextual theorists assume that texts influence one another in numerous ways,
not just through direct references to other works, but through indirect references
of which the writer may or may not be aware. Julia Kristeva, who first coined the
term "intertextuality" in the 1960s, explains that the theory is based on the
presumption that "any text builds itself as a mosaic of quotations, any text is an
absorption and transformation of another text."'" Viewed from this perspective,
literary theorist Graham Allen suggests that literary works are "[n]o longer the
product of an author's original thoughts.. . the literary work is viewed not as the
container of meaning
but as a space in which a potentially vast number of
147
relations coalesce.,
Intertextualityis both an outgrowth and a rejection of Ferdinand de Saussure's
structural view of semiotics.' Saussure, who is considered the father of modern
linguistics, developed a theory of linguistic signs in which he separated the
signifier (used to name a concept) from the signified (the concept named). His

collective contributions and hides the inevitable reliance of writers on past sources and common
cultural knowledge); Litman, sipra note 51; Lange, spra note 119; and Aoki, spra note 81.
43 KEMBREW MCLEOD, OWNING CULTURE: AUTHORSHIP, OWNERSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTYLAW 25 (2001); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
128 (1993); Frow, spra note 127, at 183.
'4 See, q., Robert H. Rotstein, Beond Meaphor CopyrightInfringement andthe Fition ofthe Work, 68
CHI.-KENTL. REV. 725 (1993); Litman, supranote 51;Jaszi, rupranote 142; and MCLEOD, supranote
143.
145SeeJaszi, supra note 142, at 458 n.9; Rotstein, rpra note 144, at 727.
'4"JULIA KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN LANGUAGE: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO LITERATURE AND ART

66 (Leon S. Roudiez ed. & Thomas Gora et al. trans., Columbia Univ. Press 1980).
147 GRAHAM ALLEN, INTERTEXTuALrrY 12 (2000).
148 See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Bally et al. eds.
& Wade Baskin, trans., 1974).
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intent was to emphasize that "a sign is not a word's reference to some object in
the world but the combination, conveniently sanctioned, between a signifier and
a signified."" 9 Noting that the signifier changes from language to language and
culture to culture, Saussure observed that the signs are relational and arbitrary,
"possessing meaning not because of referential function but because of their
function within a linguistic system as it exists at any one moment of time."'5 0
Saussure rejected the notion that signs had an independent, positive meaning of
their own, postulating instead that signs draw their meaning from their associations with other signs in a linguistic system.
Saussure's theory was revolutionary in its implication for social scientific
research on the construction of meaning. As Graham Allen explains, "[i]f
traditional notions present us with a vision of a human speaker originating the
meanings contained in his or her chosen words, then Saussure's linguistics
stem from
replaces that vision with the recognition that all acts of communication
5
choices made within a system which pre-exists any speaker."' '
Like Saussure, intertextual theorists reject the notion that meanings are
inherent in the words we speak, but unlike Saussure, they do not assume that
meaning making is divorced from human action. M.M. Bakhtin, a Russian literary
theorist, whose work heavily influenced Kristeva, was particularly concerned with
the social contexts in which individuals used language to create meaning." 2 While
Saussure viewed the relational nature of words as stemming from a generalized
and abstract system that was almost scientific in nature, Bakhtin, whose work was
influenced by Marxism, considered linguistic relationships to be inherent to
specific social sites, moments of utterance and reception.5 3 For Bakhtin, language
was a living thing, always in a state of becoming."5
Kristeva superimposes the fluctuating nature of linguistics onto texts, viewing
them as always in a state of production. Referring to the "intersection of textual
surfaces," she argues that the literary word (and by extension, text) has no fixed
meaning, but is a dialogue among the writer, the addressee, and the contemporary
or earlier cultural context.' She locates texts along horizontal and vertical axes,
in which the horizontal dimension serves as a communication between the writer
and the addressee, and the vertical dimension serves as a communication between

"'9ALLEN, supra note 147, at 8.

"0Id at 8-9.

s Id at 9.
id at 17 (discussing his theory of meaning).
153See id at 11.
154See id at 18.
"' KRISTEVA, supra note 146, at 65.
1s2 See
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earlier and later texts.'I 6 Thus, the meaning of a text is constantly changing,
depending on its audience and its spatial and temporal locale.
Employed as a literary device, intertextuality operates in a number of ways.
Some texts, for example, are simply informed by others. Consciously or
subconsciously, writers incorporate references, allusions and stories from other
texts. These borrowed elements may come from the public domain or other
protected works. They may be facts, ideas, expressive passages or scenes a faire.
Other texts are adaptations and reinterpretations of earlier works. Adaptations
may move a creative form forward by improving its quality, reinterpreting a work
to heighten its relevance to a broader audience, or modernizing a piece that has
value but for whatever reason may have fallen out of popularity." 7
Our cultural history is filled with examples of transformative works and
adaptations. One of literature's most respected writers, William Shakespeare, was
known for his adaptations of earlier writers' tales." s8 Mark Twain, a well-known
advocate of perpetual copyright, based his "A Connecticut Yankee in King
Arthur's Court" on a public domain work." 9 In music, Johann Sebastian Bach
based his Concerto for Four Harpsichords on Antonio Vivaldi's Concerto for
Four Violins in B Minor; Wolfgang Mozart adapted Joseph Haydn's work for his
Jupiter Symphony, and Ludwigvan Beethoven borrowed from French composers
Francois-Joseph Gossec and Etienne Mehul.W Vaudeville performer Groucho
Marx admitted that he and his brothers evolved their personalities by first
borrowing the works of others as they sought to establish their own personas.' 6'
Warner Brothers' Wile E. Coyote was adapted from Hopi Indian stories about a
coyote who kept falling victim to his own schemes." In film, "West Side Story"
reinterpreted Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet,"' 6 and Disney, the primary

156See id
'57 See MCLEOD,

spranote 143,

at 39-40 (discussing the folk music tradition).

1" Rotstein, pra note 144, at 789 ("[Plagiarism did not exist before the Renaissance. Thus,
Shakespeare could borrow nearly verbatim from Plutarch without raising in the minds of his
audience thoughts of plagiarism...").
's Wendy J. Gordon, The Coartitmioxafiy of CoptrghtTerra Extewion: How Long isToo Long?, 18
CARozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 682 (2000) ('Twain is sometimes referred to as an advocate of
extreme and perpetual copyright. But really, he could not have been. After all, in writing A
Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, he borrowed from the many bards who had told King

Arthur's tales in prior years.") (citing Mark Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court
(Bantam Classic ed. 1981)).
'60 MCLEOD, supra note 143, at 23.
161 See G. MARX, GROUCHO AND ME 88 (1959), as ted in Lange, spra note 119, at 162.
162

See Ramson Lomatewama, TraitionalHopiStoyteling (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan.

10,2002).
163 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 13.03A at 13-29
to 13-31 (1992).
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lobbyist for the Copyright Term Extension Act, has made millions reinterpreting
Victor Hugo's Hunchback of Notre Dame and other tales from the public
domain, including Pocahontas, Cinderella, and Snow White and the Seven
Dwarves.'"A
Intertextuality, a factor in the production of texts, is also a factor in the
reception of texts.1 61 Just as a multitude of influences bear on the writer as he or
she produces a work, the reader's or viewer's interpretation of a text will
necessarily be informed and influenced by exposure to earlier works.' In fact,
Roland Barthes, one of Kristeva's contemporaries who was also very influential
in the construction of intertextual theory, argued that audiences, not authors,
write texts. In his famous essay, "The Death of the Author," Barthes wrote:
We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single
'theological' meaning (the 'message' of the Author-God) but a
multidimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them
original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn
from the innumerable centers of culture.... [A text] is made of
multiple writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into
mutual relations of dialogue, parody, and contestation, but there is
one place where this multiplicity is focused67and that place is the
reader, not as was hitherto said, the author.'
Barthes assumes, as most intertextual theorists do, that readers bring their own
histories to the table when they interact with a text. Thus a text's meaning to a
particular audience member is determined by that person's previous exposure to
other texts. Likewise, if the reader or viewer comes back to the text after many
years and exposure to other texts, the meaning will have changed. "However, to
the extent that audiences share cultures, which is another way of saying they share
texts, they bring some common textual knowledges to bear upon text construc* 2168
tion.

'" See Christina Gifford, supra note 21, at 385-86 (noting that Disney's copyrights on Mickey
Mouse, Goofy, Pluto and Donald Duck were scheduled to expired as early as 2003 and that ten out

of thirteen sponsors for the bill in the House and eight out of twelve sponsors inthe Senate received
contributions from Disney).
16s MCLEOD, Apra note 143, at 17.
'6 SeeJ. FIsKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 108 (1987) ('The theory of intertextuality proposes that
any one text is necessarily read in relationship to others and that a range of textual knowledges is
brought to bear upon it.").
167 Barthes, smpra note 141, at 146, 148.
'68 Brian Ott & Cameron Walter, Intertixtuay:
pIntpreive PraaiceandTextualStratej, 17 CIT1cAL
STUD. IN MEDIA COMM. 429,432 n.4 (2000).
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Intertextuality is a theory that not only applies to texts in the form of books,
plays, films and musical compositions, but to culture in general.169 Our cultural
fabric is woven of all the stories, music, food, pictures and traditions that have

been passed down, appropriated

and reinterpreted throughout our history.

Media theorists Brian Ott and Cameron Walter argue that "intertextual allusions

found in postmodem texts allow viewers to exercise specialized knowledge and
to mark their membership in particular cultures."' 0 Using the example of viewers
watching television shows with intertextual references and visiting fan Web sites
during the show or immediately after to discuss those references, Ott and Walker

observe that "[i]ntertextual media encourage[s] viewers to identify with others in
a manner that less consciously intertextual media do not."' 7 ' These researchers
also see intertextuality as becoming more important in the management of
information and meaning in our society. They write that "The collage-like,
participatory nature of intertextual media fosters an aggregative rather than
sequential way of seeing and knowing. Instead of processing data as a finite set
of causal relations, audiences
favor a spatial orientation in which everything is
' 2
related to everything else.' 1
Viewed even more broadly, it is dear that intertextuality also applies to human
beings. We are the sum total of our experiences, our connections to others, and
our exposure or lack of exposure to particular ideas and concepts. We are defined
not only by who we are, but also by who and what we know and do not know.
We are texts written by a multitude of authors-essentially derivative works.
Viewed from this perspective, it is difficult to divorce the creation of texts,
culture or ourselves from the appropriation of others' expression or the public
domain. The idea/expression dichotomy, which divorces facts from their
expression, appears inadequate for analysis of such a system. 73 If all expression
comes from the past, the pubic domain-the pool of past expression-becomes

exceptionally important.

.69
See id (noting that from a cultural studies perspective, one can go further and define "text"
as a system of signs, whether those signs be a literary work, motion pictures, television shows, or the
very things that structure "real life").
170
171

Id at 440.
Id at 441.

172 id
7 See Rotstein, slpra note 144, at 759 ('Despite these attempts to define 'idea' and 'expression,'
scholars generally agree that the distinction is elusive. The dichotomy has been called ad hoc,
mythological and false.") (citations omitted).
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A. LITMAN'S THEORY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Noting the ingrained author conception in traditional legal copyright analysis,
Jessica Litman has attempted to articulate a theory of the public domain that
embraces the theory of intertextuality within our legal system.
Litman begins with the legal premise that the core requirement for copyright
protection is originality, 74 and the practical observation that very little of what is
copyrighted is truly original. 7 1 She observes that from a legal perspective the
incorporation of others' works into a new work should weaken a potential
copyright holder's claim to originality, but that this is rarely a problem for the
potential copyright holder because copyright law does not require that originality
be demonstrated before copyright is established. 76 She also observes that while
the intertextual relationships that influence the new work may come from the
public domain, fair uses of other copyrighted works, or even undiscovered theft
of others' protected work, these relationships may never be realized as outside of
the new author's own creation." In fact, if put to the wall, the new author may
not even be able to recognize the source of theinfluences in his or her work. The
influences may be subconscious. Nevertheless, once these intertextual influences
are subsumed by the new work that gains copyright protection, the new author
has the exclusive right to use them, along with the right to deny their uses to
others. 178 The rest of society loses the right of access to these same influences
that the writer borrowed. If those influences were
part of the public domain, then
79
part of the public domain has been fenced off.

174 See Litman, s"rn note 51, at 965. See alr0
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) ('Copyright protection
subsists, in accordance with this tide, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.').
"' See Litman, npra note 51, at 966-67 ("But the very act of authorship in any medium is more
akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating.... This is not parasitism: it is the
essence of authorship.").
176 See id at 974, 1003.
'7 Seeid at 1010-11.
171Litman, smpra note 51, at 1002-03 (noting that in an infringement action, a plaintiff may prove
that the defendant copied her work by introducing evidence that the defendant had access to it, but
if a defendant tries to disprove that the plaintiff's work was original to begin with, the plaintiff can
simply wave her certificate of copyright registration (a prerequisite to suit), which is prima facie
evidence of the validity of her copyright and the originality of her work); Lange, supra note 119, at
163 n.66 ('In general, the question of originality isignored or taken for granted... treated as though
it were an existential quality presumptively evidenced by the fact of the defendant's borrowing.");
Frow, smpra note 127, at 183 ("The paradox of the relation between first and second authors resides
in the fact that all first authors are themselves always second authors, indebted to their predecessors
in an endless chain.').
179 See Litman, spra note 51, at 1015 ('Giving an author a copyright in something that is a basic
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Technically copyright law protects what is original in a work, not what is
borrowed from someone else."S But copyright protection is generally applied to
the entire work because the Copyright Office has no way to determine which
aspects of the work are original, and for that matter, neither do the courts."' 1
Copyright holders, unlike applicants for patent protection, are never asked to first
delineate what is actually theirs and what is actually borrowed from others before
receiving copyright protection for a work.182 Furthermore, a system that forced
copyright holders to go through this process would be unworkable under our
present copyright scheme, which enables writers to copyright their work without
official registration."' Litman observes that in order to preserve the system as it
is we must maintain the legal fallacy of originality.
She postulates that the public domain is the tool that makes this legal fallacy
workable.'" She writes, "[w]ere we to take the legal concept of originality
seriously, we would need to ensure that authors' copyrights encompassed only
those aspects of their works that were actually original... such a dissection would
be impossible .... If it were possible, I am confident that authors would not
welcome it."' 85 Litman suggests that the public domain permits authors to "avoid
the harsh light of a genuine search for provenance," preserving the illusion of
originality.I" It is, in essence, the solution to fuzzy logic.
Litman observes that we often view the public domain as a realm of material
either undeserving of protection or as a public toll paid in exchange for a limited
monopoly on copyrighted works.8" She argues that the public domain should
instead be understood as a "device that permits the rest of the system to work by
leaving the raw material of authorship available for authors to use.""
building block of her art thus risks denying that basic building block to all other authors who come
into even fleeting contact with the first author's work.").
'- 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2001) ("The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only
to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material
employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting materiaL The
copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration,

ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.").
181 See itman, Apra note 51, at 1004 ('Prominent commentators discuss originality as if it were
an actual legal condition that a court could ascertain. Judicial decisions similarly invoke the concept

of originality. They do not, however, essay the task of determining whether and to what extent a
plaintiff's work is original.').
82 See id at 972-74 (describing when patent and copyright protections for owners attach).
is
See id at 974-75. See also 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2002) ('[Rjegistration is not a condition of

copyright protection.'").

184Litman, supranote 51, at 967.
185 Id

at 1011-12.
Id at 1012.
187 Id at 1012-13.
186

"8

Id at 968.
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B. FACTS AND ORIGINALITY

To Litman's theory I would also point out that denial of a concept of
originality in copyright law is a dangerous business because the refusal to protect
facts in our copyright system is predicated upon the belief that facts are
nonoriginal 89 The theory assumes that a discoverer of a fact cannot claim
copyright to it because he is not the author of that fact; he may only claim
expression of that fact.' 9 Once we deny the concept of originality of expression,
we drop the barrier between facts and expression. If the two concepts are
lumped together, then facts may lose their place of honor and become subject to
9
proprietary use.' '
And, as professor Jane Ginsburg has pointed out, that barrier is already
porous. Ginsburg observes that contrary to the Platonic view of fact discovery,
facts do not exist independently of individual perception.'92 Researchers work
from a variety of theoretical, methodological and perceptual perspectives that
color their interpretation of facts.' When broken down, every scientific study
has one or more qualitative aspects-the design of the study, the choice of
research question, the sample selection, the evidence gathered, the data manipulation. All are based on researcher choices. Consequently, all data are open to
interpretation and contain some expressive elements.
In a circular fashion, the concept of originality protects what is
nonoriginal-both in expression and in fact. But it is a concept in need of an
opposing force, which is the public domain. Protecting the public domain as a
wellspring of creativity not only preserves the illusion of originality for authorial

189

Melville B. Nimmer, The Su.ebt MaterofCopyightUndertheActof 1976,24 UCLA L REv. 978,

1015-16 (1977).
"9 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,347 (" 'No one may claim originality

as to facts.' This is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction
is one between creation and discovery.") (citing Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 1 Nimmer
on Copyright, S 2.11[A], at 2-157).
' This idea is not as farfetched as it may seem. Before Feist, 499 U.S. at 340, courts held that
reproductions of factual information from copyrighted directories could constitute infringement
(see, e.g.,Jeweler's Circular Publ'g Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cit. 1922); Leon v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d
484, 34 U.S.P.Q. 237 (9th Cir. 1937); and Adventures in Good Eatingv. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d
809, 56 U.S.P.Q. 242 (7th Cir. 1942)). Moreover, recently Congress has considered and the House
of Representatives has on three occasions approved legislation that would extend intellectual
property protection to the factual content of collections of factual information in computer
databases. (See H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R 2281, % 501-502, 105th Cong. (Engrossed
House Bill 1998); H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998)).
192Jane Ginsburg, Sabotagi andReosttrufingHistory: A Comment on the Scope ofCopightProtecion
in lWorks fHijtogyAfterHoehling v. Universal City Studios, 29 BuLL. COPYRIGHTSoc'Y U.S.A. 647,
658 (1982).
19 Id at 658-60.
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integrity and legal purposes, but also serves the utilitarian purpose of protecting
expression and the pursuit of knowledge.
VI. CONCLUSION

In its brief to the Court, the government essentially challenges the petitioners
to show why the idea/expression dichotomy does not resolve their First
Amendment concerns regarding the public domain. 94 This Article has attempted
to answer that challenge by pointing out that authorship is systematic, and that
while the idea/expression dichotomy may be an appropriate analysis for the use
of one work, it is not appropriate for an entire system. The CTEA does not just
burden one work; it burdens the system by delaying access to work already
protected for extensive periods by another twenty years.
Legal scholars who believe Congress has gone too far by extending copyright
term limits argue that an additional twenty years is unnecessary to encourage
creators to produce new works, and possibly counter-productive to creativity that
relies on the public domain. 9 Meanwhile, proponents of the extension counter
that even if copyright is not serving as an incentive to produce new works, it is
arguably serving as an incentive to market established works to their fullest
1 96 Under this theory,
capacity, and in doing so, contributing to the economy.
copyright's purpose is served when protectionism encourages greater marketing
of works, which in turn leads to greater consumption of these cultural products
and increased profits that may be reinvested in the creation of more works.
This is ultimately a trade-based argument thatin order to compete internationally the United States has to comply with terms set by other countries. But even
after changing the term of copyright protection, the United States does not
comply with the copyright philosophies of most of its European trading
partners.' 97 We do not observe the continental tradition of recognizing moral
rights. While offering the minimum amount of protection allowable under the
Berne Convention, the United States has become one of the largest producers (if
not the largest producer) of intellectual property in the world. 9 8 Perhaps that is
because we have followed our own path where intellectual property is concerned.
While other countries protected moral rights, we encouraged derivative and fair

'" Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 20, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir.
2001), LEXIS No. 01-618, 2001 U.S. Briefs 618 (Oct. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Respondent in
Opposition].
"'
"

See supranote 12 and accompanying text.
See Miller, supra note 18, at 692-93.

See Dixon, supra note 37, at 964.
See MCLEOD, supra note 143, at 6 (noting that by the mid-1990s, intellectual property
accounted for more than twenty percent of world trade, amounting to $240 billion U.S. dollars).
"

"g
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use. When other countries signed the Berne Convention Agreement in 1886, we
held out until 1988. 99
Under critical examination, the argument to extend protection to the
European standard of life plus seventy years really comes down to the need to
protect American works whose protection will lapse in foreign countries after
they are probably more than 100 years old. Will the demand for 100-year-old
American works in foreign countries be so great that the profits are worth putting
a twenty-year freeze on the public domain? Who will incur these profits, and is
the balance in the interest of society?
Twice in its brief, the government points out that the petitioners' argument
that Congress is restricted by the "promote progress" language in the Copyright
Clause is purely academic.'
I suppose that the argument presented here for
freedom of expression is also purely academic. But it is one that is gaining steam.
Numerous legal scholars believe that Congress has already pushed copyright
protection too far, that we are on a sliding slope, and to go any further not only
risks permanently damaging the system upon which cultural developments thrive,
but also eliminating any constitutionally grounded discourse in copyright law."1
If this addition of twenty years is constitutionally permissible, will another twenty
be added after that, and then again after that? At what point do we say "too
much"? At what point do we acknowledge that the public domain is worth
protection?

See Berne, supra note 28.
0 Respondent in Opposition, sxpra note 194, at 13a, 14.
So
See Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Rulutdant (and Per&h*r Prematur) Adieu to a
Cotutituional-GroundedDircourreof PubEi Intert in Copyight Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 595,
19

599-600 (1996).
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